On the 12 of April the CNIS held conference on “How to end merger of political and economic power in the post-Soviet space: lessons of national and international experience”

This was the third in the series of “Azerbaijan Democratic Republic ( ADDR)  round tables”, devoted to the most actual issues of transition in Azerbaijan.

The first Azerbaijan People’s  Republic has been known  for its high standards of democratic governance and deeply rooted concept of “ conflict of interests”. A century later,  one of the characteristics of  post-Soviet states after 20 years of transition  appeared to be  a merger – to a various degrees in different states -  of political and economic power. This trend  has been creating  serious obstacle  to both key objectives of transition -development of free market and democratic governance. The conference tried to discuss the following questions: Why did  this trend take over in some states of Eurasia?  What are the reasons behind it? Are they cultural, or instrumental? Is it a specific historical stage in development of any state? Are economic or political reasons predominantly responsible for this phenomenon? How is respect for Constitution and the concept of rule of law related to this? What are the institutional and societal  conditions  preventing  such a merger and making legal provisions of “ conflict of interests” a  working  concept? What can we learn from our own history of 1918-1920, our neighboring states – Turkey, Georgia  and  states with established democracies- USA ?

The round table hosted prominent scholars and experts from the USA – Dr. Charles Fairbanks, Turkey- Dr. Ramazan Gozen  and Azerbaijan- expert  Togrul  Juvarli. The first  panel was opened by Dr. Fairbanks who analyzed the factors, which keep the merger alive. He mentioned fear of losing property and going to jail, lack of rule of law making parallel with Saakashvili’s Georgia) , or making reference to Trotskii in early 20^th century, tremendous power of compromat  or blackmail  which is much stronger in the post-Soviet space than anywhere else in the world due to the prominence of “moral” issues  for  regime, and eventually insecurity of rulers due to the doubtful  legitimacy of their power.

When speaking about deeper causes of the merger he stressed that this is in no way cultural, but political phenomenon. As Saakashvili proved it in Georgia  with his successful struggle with corruption– corruption comes from politics, not from culture.  The factor  which weakened corruption in the West – is a new impersonality of power . The Soviet Union destroyed a public world. The services were delivered through individuals  rather than categories, so in the post-Soviet period there were a lot of triggers for intensified theft . The other aspect is that in the USSR people were forced to be good and usually after that the period of corruption follows ( like in the post civil war USA).  Where the basis of power is shaky , the rules always try to buy support.

As most of these were Soviet legacies, and its influence is waning, the merger will also weaken.

The other factor is that money gained by dictators through politics ( official position) might be dangerous, as they lack legitimacy. Besides, political corruption might be separated from the system ( US local politics is still corrupt), political corruption may change very quickly and other. Dr. Fairbanks stressed again, that the state is the author ( not the culture) of the merger of political and economic power.

Togrul  Juvarli focused on the merger of  politics and economics  in Azerbaijan.  He stressed that in anticipation of the decline of oil production by the 2016 the government is expected to diversify the economy. This requires participation of people in the economy, but they are in fact consistently isolated  from economy. Modernization , e-government – those reforms are of cosmetic nature , because of the merger of political and economic power in the country. The trend in Azerbaijan shows, that economic functions of the ministries are growing, because they become “owners” and they developed economic interests.

He mentioned the second trend, which is that capital business fights small  business, as it was the case with the Baku steel company. On the other hand, the information on the business is getting restricted – through such as the recently adopted law on access to commercial information, while so strongly required laws on state sales and competition code are stuck in the parliament.

The speaker suggested two ways out: legalization of the capital and defining our place in the civilizations ( identity).

The speaker from Turkey Prof. Ramazan Gozen gave an overview of three major approaches to economy –liberal, Marxism, economic  realism.  He described Turkey to experience the influence of all  three models.   Turkey since 20s has transformed from semi-Marxist to liberal model. Traditionally in Turkey the concept of state as the centralized economic  and political power  has been dominating. As an example he referred to  the fact that in 1915 in Ottoman Empire  80% of all companies were private. The management however was in the hands of sultan, who gave these companies  for rent to the foreigners. This was a private property under  the state control. This stimulated FDIs of such big companies as BP, Coca  Cola, General  Electric etc.  In the end of 20s to 1950s – the influence changed from liberal to Marxist, and during the Cold War period – again towards liberalism. Westernization in this process played an important role. The  In fact, stressed the speaker, the history of Turkey is a competition between the Kemalist political forces in the center with economic religious forces in the periphery.

The transformation of the Turkey into a liberal model  was promoted by the following political leaders -  Menderes, Ozal and Erdogan.   The 4 military coup’s  d’etats were also promoting a centralized state. Turkey does not have a totally liberal economic model, but it completely moved away from the half-Marxist one.

In Turkey’s modern history none of the political leaders were rich men. The respect for Constitution and the rule of law are another important factors contributing to the separation between economic and political power.

The presentations stimulated an intense discussions. An expert  Dr. Zohrab Ismayil stressed the increasing role of state in Azerbaijan’s economy  by referring to the substantial investments in the state owned companies instead of the process of privatization. Dr. Zardusht Ali-zade  noticed that government is indeed thinking in Marxist terms, that economics is key to politics. Unlike the 90s, when the ministers got enriched through corruption, in 2000s they all became businessmen – owners of big holdings. The economic and political power has merged and got criminalized. That’s why new draft law on the conflict on interests for bureaucracy was withdrawn from the discussions in the  parliament.  The official privatization stopped, but the intense unofficial privatization is going on.

Togrul Juvarli  suggested, that changeability of the political leaders is one of the key ways  towards separation of political and economic power. According to Dr. Ramazam Gozen, democratization was a critical factor in Turkey promoting this separation.

You can read the media coverage of this conference in the following sources

The following are some recent restrictions on civil society space and democratic freedoms in Azerbaijan.
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Development of the democratic institutions in the post-Soviet oil rich states of the Caspian region faces additional to the common soviet legacies structural obstacles. These characteristics include first of all ruling elite’s monopoly over oil and gas resources, which in the absence of the real mechanisms of the public control further limits development of political pluralism and transparent elections. What are the characteristics of the development of political parties and elections in Azerbaijan, Russia and Kazakhstan? Which electoral system would be the most conducive for the development of political pluralism and party system in such countries?  Is it possible to avoid “pacted”  democracy, when building of democratic institutions either is suppressed or replaced by the contracts (pacts) between the political parties and ruling elites  to get an access to abundant resources? How to design the most effective strategy to counteract these tendencies? What is the role of the civil society in this process?

The head of the CNIS Dr. Leila Alieva opened the conference  with the  analysis of the legal, political, social and economic conditions of the party development in Azerbaijan. Characterizing the legal environment of the political party formation in Azerbaijan, she referred to the study which she authored with the support of the OSCE/ODIHR office on Political Party Regulation in Azerbaijan ( 2012) ( www.cnis-baku.org) and stressed that increasingly restrictive  political party regulation in Azerbaijan since 1993 has created unfavorable conditions for the multiparty system in the country. Although the number of the registered  parties reached 54  ( compare to Kazakhstan’s – 9 and Russia’s – 30) very few of them have a real constituency and only 2 or 3 have an influence on the political life in the country. The legal and policy restrictions regarding environment in which the parties function – such as on freedom of speech and freedom of assembly – has also significantly contributed to undermining of the multi party system. Undeveloped free market and economic monopolies delayed formation of classes of the producers, free from the state control- potential constituencies of political parties and basis for platforms and ideologies. Political motivation of the ruling elite– fear of group mobilization – blocked development of big enterprises, of small and medium business,  and delayed diversification of economy, which would inevitably liberate economic producers. In the oil rich states, stressed Dr. Alieva, the political economy of resource dependent countries leads to the fact the political process from below is replaced by resource based patronage from above, which in Azerbaijan is very strict. Against the background of the delay in formation of the independent middle class, which would constitute the basis for the parties, the exceedingly restrictive legal conditions for party financing has an additional negative impact on their formation. The most recent amendments to the Law on Political Parties on state financing of the parties, although is a welcomed decision, as it was made in line with recommendation of the international organizations, such as OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission, was designed in such a way, that only the ruling and pro-government parties would benefit from this provision due to a non-transparent nature of elections in the country. Dr. Alieva has also stressed the impact of all this on the growing personalization of parties and replacement of the competition of ideas by the competition of leaders. She mentioned   flaws in strategies and tactics of the parties themselves and international institutions, involved in trainings of political parties, saying, that the failure to include the traits of the resource  based political economy in the parties’ and organizations’  aid strategies  has led to the low efficiency of aid and trainings. In her analysis she warned that ignorance of the international experience of developing oil and gas resources before the democratic institutions are in place, would lead to the prolonged stagnation and increased probability of the social explosions in the country. She brought an example of the specific way of power change in Venezuela, which Stanford University professor Terry Lynn Karl called “pacted democracy”, when the power and the parties come to the agreement in such a way that it only feeds in political “statu quo”, which re-enforces the effects of the “resource curse” rather than leads to democratic process and free and fair elections.

The guest speaker from  Kazakhstan Victor Kovtunovskii gave a comprehensive analysis of the political party system in Kazakhstan. He characterized the current state of party system in Kazakhstan as depressive. The domination of one-ruling- party and unfavorable conditions for functioning of the other parties have been the obstacles for a real political competition. Currently the parties could be divided in three groups – ruling party, pro-government parties and an opposition. Not unlike in Azerbaijan, the restrictive legislation, non-transparent elections, significantly limited powers of legislature – all this had its impact on capability of political parties.  Regarding nature of power change Dr. Kovtunovskii listed a number of factors which should be in place to lead to a real changes in the country- among them, the state of civil society and its readiness for change, the world oil prices, the state of economies of the big powers USA, EU and China, geopolitical environment( including Russia), presence of eloquent and effective opposition and other.

Dr. Kovtunovskii stressed that elites in post-Soviet Kazakhstan are both interested in changes, and  at the same time are afraid of them, due to the questioned legitimacy of their capital and property. The large percentage of minorities ( 40% ) living in Kazakhstan also contributes to the greater conservatism of the population. He agreed that “Dutch decease”, features of tax collection, corruption from above are peculiarities of the oil rich states, but noted that the influence of the resource curse on the political systems has not  been studied well yet.

The example of countries like Mongolia, which in spite of the rich natural resources, has shown impressive progress in democracy and state building, give grounds for optimism and proves that the policy choices and the political will play a role in overcoming the “ resource curse”.

The nature of elections in Azerbaijan since independence had changed to worse, stressed the next speaker Anar Mammadli, the chair of the  Election Monitoring and Democracy Center. Having started in 1993,   this trend surged after 2003 elections, when the public protests against falsifications were severely suppressed by authorities – around 800 people were detained and arrested. The last presidential elections of 2008 lacked according to the OSCE/ODIHR observation mission report politically competitive environment. The other turning point was beginning inflow of “ big oil” revenues in 2004., which dramatically changed the whole political picture by what the speaker called “corruptionalization” of the political process. The growing number of NGOs with unknown sources of financing, the monthly budget of some of which reached over 500 thousand manats  has started to emerge. March 2009 referendum lifted two terms limits of president in office, which significantly undermined chances of power change through transparent elections. The last municipal elections led to 78% seats going to ruling party YAP and 2010 parliamentary left out two major opposition parties outside of Milli Mejlis, as non-registration of the opposition candidates ( 400 candidates not being registered in the latter)  becomes a routine. The electoral code was amended during the 2000s towards greater restrictions of the competitive environment. Anar Mammadli stressed also the role of political culture, such as parochialism, in consistent worsening of the nature of elections. According to the speaker, as a result of systematically flawed electoral process, the evidence of  public disappointment in the institute of elections  is found in the survey, where more than half of the respondents gave their preference to participation in the public protest  over participation in presidential elections.

The political stagnation in the post-Soviet oil rich states, according to the guest speaker from Russia head of the NiccoloM consulting company Igor Mintusov is based on two keystones:

1. Irrevocability of the leaders of the states
2. Paternalistic and indifferent attitude , or fears, of the population.

Election is an instrument of political manipulation and depends on opportunistic interests of elites. In Russia the traits of the political system are similar to those in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan but with greater elements of competitiveness due to its relatively greater closeness to European culture. One of such peculiarities is that falsifications have its limits in Russia. For instance, in the latest ( December 2011) parliamentary elections the ruling party United Russia got less than 50% ( 49,2%), while the official percentage of support to the presidents and ruling parties in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan has been growing . According to Igor Mintusov opinion falsifications are beneficial both to the ruling elite and the opposition, as the latter gets an excuse to write off its own mistakes of strategic and tactical character on the falsified elections. Against the background of the passivity of the civil society, the replacement of the governors increasingly bears imitational character, political opposition is divided and marginalized. The main problem in Russia, the speaker stressed is the merger of executive and judicial branches of power, which eliminates the opportunity of the protection of votes and integrity of elections through legal state institutions. In the end, Igor Mintusov shared his experience and methods of participating in electoral campaigns in Russia and internationally. The event was followed by intense discussions, during which in response to the questions the speaker concluded, that for the fair and transparent elections to happen, not only political will of the government, but the will of societies should be in place.

You can read the media coverage of this conference in the following sources

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oVE1BTNyzso

http://contact.az/docs/2013/Politics/020800027768ru.htm#.URaHhvJ46So

http://deyerler.org/153566-neftlj-zjngin-pot-sovet-glkjljrindj-siyasi-partiyalar-vj-segkiljrin-durumu-mgzakirj-olundu.html

http://www.newsmeeting.com/az/n/5723524-neftle-zengin-pot-sovet-olkelerinde-siyasi-partiyalar-ve-seckilerin-durumu-muzakire-olundu.aspx

http://gozetci.az/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2477:bakda-demokratiya-il-bal-beynlxalq-konfrans-kecirilib-fotolar&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=37

http://www.musavat.com/new/%C3%96lk%C9%99/143881-NEFTL%C6%8F_Z%C6%8FNG%C4%B0N_%C3%96LK%C6%8FL%C6%8FR%C4%B0N_DEMOKRAT%C4%B0YA_PROBLEM%C4%B0_M%C3%9CZAK%C4%B0R%C6%8F_ED%C4%B0LD%C4%B0

http://www.azadliq.info/xeberler/358-xeber/27019-neft-leneti-ve-seckiler.html

The problems of unresolved conflicts in the Caucasus region are very often explained in realist terms, geopolitics  or through the conspiracy theories. However, the domestic actors are key forces in these conflicts and little is said about the influence of transformation ( or lack of it)  of political and social institutions, including mindset of the people in the region,  on their resolution..

The participants tried to answer the following questions: In what  way conflicts and approach to their resolution depend on ideology and world view? What are particular traits of the societies in the Eurasian space which hinder soonest resolution of the conflicts? What are the stereotypes in the region  related to the liberalism and conflicts, which need to be  addressed? Nationalism and liberalism – how can they be reconciled? How can liberalism/liberal ideology contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflicts? How in practice these ideas can be promoted?

Dr.Leila Alieva ( CNIS director)  in the position paper suggested, that lack of democracy and  freedoms in authoritarian or hybrid regimes in the region, including Russia, hindered  development of liberalism, which in turn affected the resolution of conflicts.  She stressed an importance of the  political and social transformation in the states in conflict as a factor in this process. Describing the reasons of deadlock in negotiations, she  noted  besides the deficiencies of mediation, absence of effective normative framework and interference in secessionist conflicts of the neighboring-states,  lack of democracy and liberal values. However, democracy  is a necessary, but not the  ultimate  pre-requisite of  the breakthrough in resolution of Post-Soviet conflicts. Building of institutions of checks and balances, inclusive policies towards minorities, freedoms of media and assembly and  deep societal adoption of the liberal values such  as tolerance, inclusiveness and universalism of human rights is a process which will significantly accelerate and facilitate the resolution of conflicts. Thus without addressing the “ extension of borders of mindsets “ of people  all the international attempts  to resolve the conflict are doomed to failure.

Dr. Ghia Nodia from Ilia Chavchavadze University in Georgia  called his approach that of “skeptical liberal” and focused on the content of the concept of liberalism and  its values.  In the context  of conflicts, however, he noted the controversial character of liberalism, stressing that while “liberals do not fight each other, due to their arrogance towards the rest non-liberal part of the world, they may be aggressive and conflictual  to “non-liberals”. He also spoke about failures of some liberal postulates, such as that modernization will lead to the disappearance of conflicts, and that nationalism and liberalism contradict each other. The other contradiction is that during the history  liberals have not always been democrats. Prof. Nodia  suggested, that liberalism can help in prevention of violent conflicts, rather than resolution of already  “frozen conflicts”. While calling supporters of the idea of ‘transformation’ of conflicts naïve, prof. Nodia  agreed that spread of the liberal institutions can prevent development of nationalist demagogy and thus contribute to the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

The author of numerous books on political and social transformation of Russia, the leading researcher of Siberian branch of Russian Academy of Sciences Dr. Nikolai Rozov  presented his macro-sociological model of historical development of Russia,  consisting of “cycles”, which he called  “ruts and passes”. These cycles, which are  non-chaotic , develop from “state success” and “ freedoms” to “state failures” and repressions”,.  He stressed, that development of Russia is an order of cycles, which repeat each other not allowing the political and state building to transfer to the sustainable level. As usual, all the periods of Russia’s  liberalization resulted in a crisis and an authoritarian  backlash.  Rozov further spoke about effects of Russia’s domestic political situation  on its foreign policy and gave some predictions on domestic developments.

Dr. Ali Abasov focused on relations between ideologies and approaches to conflicts, which he stressed had predominantly political nature, based on his  overview of major conflicts in Europe and Asia. He mentioned a number of traits of Eurasian societies, including legacies of totalitarianism and clan structures and absence of free and fair elections, which hinder resolution of conflicts. Abasov also noted that liberal approaches to resolution of conflicts may directly threaten the very existence of the unitary state, as have risks of separation and division of states. At the same time, as conflicts  often unfold  as a result of democratization they may also threaten democracy building  itself, as have a potential to cause  a state response of  backlash. Prof. Abasov also noted widely shared perception of “liberal” as a “neutrality” of state or other actor in relations to international norms and principles.

Dr. Rahman Badalov welcomed  the idea of moving from the geopolitics towards social consciousness in interpretation of the causes of unresolved conflicts. Furthermore, he focused on enlightenment and liberalism  as a focal point of the analysis . He stressed the role of the enlightenment of Azerbaijan in the 19^thcentury as a central point of the history, laying foundation of the current nation’s and state’s identity, while underlining the damaging role of the Soviet era. He described post-Soviet development as mainly stagnation, which did not  mindsets’  liberation from the Soviet legacies. He stressed that resolution of the conflict goes through  democracy, enlightenment  and liberalism – through return of the ontological history, through readiness and capacity to think.  Prof. Badalov suggested that the conflicts will be resolved only when on both sides there will be people, who do not use nationalist or historical arguments, or what the author called cooperation of post-nationalist and post-historical elites.

The full articles of the speakers will be published in the forthcoming volume by the CNIS.

You can read the media coverage of this conference in the following sources

http://www.olaylar.az/news/politics/21580

http://sestv.az/az/reporting/323273

http://deyerler.org/146710-vpost-sovet-tjfjkkgrgngn-durulmasd-liberalizm-vj-mgnaqiejljrin-hjlliv-mgvzusunda-beynjlxalq-konfrans-kegirilib.html

http://www.obyektiv.tv/index.php?option=com_jomtube&view=video&id=3828&Itemid=33&lang=az

http://www.publika.az/index.php?action=static_detail&static_id=28316

http://www.newsmeeting.com/az/n/5120817–post-sovet-tefekkurunun-durulmasi-liberalizm-ve-munaqiselerin-helli-movzusunda-beynelxalq-konfran.aspx

http://faktxeber.com/liberallar-digrlrin-zlrindn-aa-xslr-kimi-baxrlar-_h415149.html

Between 27 and 30 November 2012, Baroness Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, undertook her first official visit to four of the five Central Asian republics: Kyrgyzstan,Uzbekistan,Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. In each of these countries, she held talks with the presidents of the states. In Kyrgyzstan she additionally attended an EU-Central Asia Ministerial meeting, where the Turkmen government also was represented.

Civic Solidarity members believe the visit should have been usedas an opportunity to convey more forcefully an EU message of support for human rights and civil society, explicitly linking progress in these areas to strengthened EU engagement with the Central Asian countries.

Official visits on this level are a rare occurrence in Central Asia. Each of the Central Asian republics faces enormous challenges in the sphere of human rights and democracy. While there are considerable differences between the four countries Ashton visited, one aspect shared by all is that their human rights movements are under pressure and greatly anticipated Ashton’s arrival, particularly given the strengthening of EU’s human rights policy in June 2012.

The EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy that was adopted in the summer reinforced treaty obligations for EU institutions to “place human rights at the centre of its relations with all third countries”[1]. It also set out an obligation for EU officials to “raise human rights issues vigorously in all appropriate forms of bilateral political dialogue, including at the highest level.”

While Ashton’s discussions with heads of state were closed to the public, the public statements she made afterwards bore witness of a one-sided focus on energy, security and trade during the talks, with little attention given to human rights issues. None of these statements included any degree of detail on the human rights issues covered, and the remarks she made after meeting with the president of Kazakhstan made no mention at all that human rights were among the issues discussed, while noting that the talks had “focused on economic and trade issues”. This apparent failure to bring human rights to the forefront of the agenda was met with disappointment by the region’s human rights defenders, in particular in Kazakhstan, where restrictions on freedom of expression and other fundamental freedoms have escalated rapidly in the recent period and civil society has come under growing pressure.

Moreover, while human rights issues can be expected to be integrated into behind-the-door discussions the EU conducts with third party governments, it is also crucial that high-ranking EU officials take a strong public stand on pressing human rights problems in countries they visit. This is instrumental as a means of showing that the EU is serious about human rights and of communicating support to civil society actors in these countries in their struggle against injustice and repression. In our view, the commitments set out in the EU Rights Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights should have prompted High Representative Ashton to give more priority to human rights and to publicly and prominently denounce serious human rights violations during her visit to the Central Asian republics.

The responsibility of the EU to act visibly as a pro-human rights actor in relation to third countries is further highlighted by the EU’s peace and rights legacy for which itreceived international recognition on 12 October 2012, when it was announced that the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize will be awarded to the European Union. In its announcement, the Norwegian Nobel Committee pointed to the role the European Union has played in the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights.

In the twenty-three years that have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the European Union and its member states have done considerable work to promote respect for human rights and democratic values in Eastern Europe.Now is the time to take these values to those parts of the former Soviet Union that may be geographically distant from Brussels, but which share a common history and culture with Europe and are members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Europe’s values demand that high-ranking European officials dare to ask the difficult questions, on behalf of those few who try every day to raise them on their ownat considerable risk to their personal safety and security. The human rights situation in Central Asia is particularly dire, and the following list identifies but a few of the issues that human rights defenders in the region expected to be raised:

• The lack of an independent investigation into the 2005 Andijan events in Uzbekistan;
• The systematic use of torture in Uzbekistani jails;
• Long prison sentences without evidence handed down in unfair trials for ethnic Uzbeks in the south of Kyrgyzstan following the 2010 violent clashes;
• The wrongful imprisonment of human rights defender Azimzhan Askarov on the basis of politically motivated charges linked to violent clashes in the south of Kyrgyzstan in 2010;
• The 7 ½ year prison sentenceof Kazakhstani opposition leader Vladimir Kozlov linked tohis public support for the Zhanaozen oil worker protests that preceded the December 2011 unrest in this region;
• The lack of a legal base forthe initiative made to close independent media in Kazakhstan,the week after it became a member of the UN Human Rights Council;
• The blocking of Facebook and other websites  by Tajikistani authorities this month; and
• The disproportionate use of force, including the killing of civilians,as part of a police investigation in Gorno-Badakshan in Tajikistan in July 2012;
• Unrelenting persecution of civil society in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan;
• The continued use of band on travel abroad to punish individuals considered disloyal to the regime in Turkmenistan.

While some of these issues have been the subject of public EU statements in other contexts, we consider that they would have deserved to have been prominently and visibly brought up during the High Representative’s visit to Central Asia.

Only through a consistent, no-negotiations approach to human rights will Central Asia reach its true potential, and only when human rights are respected can Central Asia become a reliable counterpart to the EU – in security, in energy, and in partnership.

Analytical Centre for Interethnic Cooperation and Consultation (Georgia)

Article 19 (United Kingdom)

Association of Ukrainian Human Rights Monitors on Law Enforcement (Ukraine)

Belarusian Human Rights House in exile, Vilnius

Bulgaran Helsinki Committee (Bulgaria)

Centre for Civil Liberties (Ukraine)

Centre for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights (Russia)

Centre for National and International Studies (Azerbaijan)

Charter for Human Rights (Kazakhstan)

Crude Accountability (United States)

Foudation for Parliamentarism Development  (Kazakhstan)

Foundation for Regional Initiatives (Ukraine)

Freedom Files (Russia)

Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (Georgia)

Golos Svobody (Kyrgyzstan)

Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law (Kazakhstan)

Kharkiv Regional Foundation “Public Alternative” (Ukraine)

Helsinki Citizen’s Assembly – Vanadzor (Armenia)

Helsinki Committee of Armenia (Armenia)

Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (Poland)

Human Rights Club (Azerbaijan)

Human Rights Monitoring Institute (Lithuania)

International Foundation for Protection of Freedom of Speech Adil Soz (Kazakhstan)

International Partnership for Human Rights (Belgium)

Legal Policy Research Centre (Kazakhstan)

Legal Transformation Centre (Belarus)

Moscow Helsinki Group (Russia)

Norwegian Helsinki Committee (Norway)

Nota Bene (Tajikistan)

People in Need (Czech Republic)

Promo LEX Association (Moldova)

Public Verdict (Russia)

United Against Racism (Netherlands)

Tatiana Chernobil, independent Expert (Kazakhstan)

Address:  1, Azadliq Avenue , Park Inn by Radisson hotel,  2^nd floor, Baku , Azerbaijan.

The working languages of the conference are Azerbaijani  and Russian.

Please, RSVP to ziba.murtuzova@mail.ru  or  GSM +99470 5025332

The 7^th assembly  was devoted to the recent  global trends of democracy development, new  achievements  and challenges it currently faces  to enable scholars and practitioners , activists, NGOs and human rights defenders to raise effectiveness of their work. As usual, it created a unique opportunity for people united by common goals  internationally  to exchange ideas and experience which would help them to deepen   the vision and  to enrich strategies, to build network and  promote their causes. The  plenary sessions  featured prominent democracy activists, such as Nobel Laureate Tawakkul Karman ( Yemen), Yevgeni Zhovtis ( Kazakhstan),  Glanis Changachirere ( Zimbabwe).  More than 50 workshops and panels were devoted to wide variety of issues related to responses of the democratic community to the modern global trends in governance, development and revision  of the strategies  of the civil activists in accordance with  the new challenges to the democracy building.

The CNIS has co-organized the panel  “Defending Civil Societies” – How to work  in Legally Repressive environments”  with  Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition ( Chair Okay Machisa), one of the biggest NGOs in Africa which unites  300 organizations in Zimbabwe  working towards  achievement of sustainable peace and democracy in the country. At the panel on the 16^th of October, which was moderated by Leila Alieva and Okay Machisa,  the views of major  continents of the world were represented. The participants from  USA, Venezuela, Burma , Africa and post-Soviet space  made interventions about the global trends, problems and  success stories their countries experience on the path to open and  fully democratic systems.

The CNIS president,  Dr.Leila Alieva, has also spoken  at the panel on the 17^th of October  “ Challenges  to Democracy Assistance: Confronting the New Authoritarianism”, along with Christopher Walker ( USA), Rodrigo Diamanti ( Venezuela), Renee Xia ( China), Marek Svoboda ( Czech Republic).

The WMD has also created a unique opportunity for an alumni meeting of many Reagan Fascell fellows of the National Endowment for Democracy at the reception which NED organized on the 16^th evening.

The  Assembly had enjoyed an official reception of the Municipality and Mayor of the city of Lima – Susanna Villaran de la Puente.

16^th Session of the UPR Working Group

REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN

Submitted 9 October 2012

Joint Submission by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, NGO in General Consultative Status with ECOSOC  

and

Center for National and International Studies (CNIS)

         CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation

         Mr Mandeep Tiwana, Email mandeep.tiwana@civivus.org

Ms Renate Bloem, Email renate.bloem@gmail.com

Tel +27 11 8335959, Web www.civicus.org

Center for National and International Studies (CNIS)

Ms Leila Alieva, Email admin@cnis-baku.org

Web www.cnis-baku.org

1. 1.             (A) Introduction

1.1         CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation is an international movement with members in more than 100 countries worldwide. Established in 1993, CIVICUS nurtures the foundation, growth and protection of citizen action throughout the world, especially in areas where participatory democracy and citizen’s freedom of association are threatened.

1.2         Center for National and International Studies (CNIS) is an independent non-profit institution based in Baku, Azerbaijan. CNIS conducts non-partisan research, covering a wide variety of issues, such as regional conflicts and security; oil and politics; state and democracy building; foreign and domestic policies. The institution also carries out activities related to democracy promotion and human rights.

1.3         In this document, CIVICUS and CNIS outline concerns related to the environment in which civil society organisations and human rights defenders operate in Azerbaijan, and discuss threats they face in the exercise of the freedoms of expression, association and assembly.

1.4         Political pluralism in Azerbaijan remains tightly restricted thereby reducing the space for citizens and civil society to exercise their right of democratic dissent. Since March 2011, there have been persistent protests in Azerbaijan demanding greater political freedoms. These protests have been brutally suppressed and those participating in them have had to face various forms of persecution.

1.5         CIVICUS and CNIS are concerned by persistent harassment, intimidation and attacks against independent journalists, human rights defenders and political activists by state agents. Civil society organisations (CSOs) and media houses have also had to face various forms of bureaucratic harassment for their criticism of the government.

1.6         CIVICUS and CNIS are alarmed by the failure of the Azerbaijan Government to protect members of civil society in the exercise of their rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly.

• In section B, CIVICUS and CNIS highlight concerns regarding freedom of assembly, attacks on and harassment of protestors.
• In section C, CIVICUS and CNIS highlight concerns regarding judicial harassment and intimidation of human rights defenders and journalists.
• In section D, CIVICUS and CNIS highlight concerns regarding freedom of association and unwarranted bureaucratic harassment of civil society organisations (CSOs).
• In section E, CIVICUS and CNIS make a number of recommendations in the areas of concern listed.

2.         (B) Concerns regarding freedom of assembly, attacks on and harassment of protestors

2.1              Article 49 of Azerbaijan’s constitution guarantees the right to assemble peacefully and to organise meetings, demonstrations, processions and place pickets upon notification. Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to which Azerbaijan is a state party also guarantees the freedom of peaceful assembly.

2.2              Since March 2011, there have been on-going protests in Azerbaijan in support of greater political freedoms parallel to the pro-democracy protests across the Middle-East and North Africa Region. These protests increased in intensity in the run-up to the Eurovision Contest organised in May 2012 in the capital, Baku. Activists and concerned citizens under the banner of ‘Sing for Democracy’ sought to highlight severe restrictions on democratic freedoms as international spotlight was focused on Azerbaijan as a result of the Eurovision contest. The response of the authorities to the peaceful protests has been heavy handed and brutal. Many of the protestors have been subjected to beatings and judicial harassment for exercising their right to democratic dissent.

2.3              On 25 May 2012, roughly 70 peaceful protestors were apprehended by police prior to the Eurovision Contest for participating in a ‘Public Walk’ campaign in Baku. They were bundled into police vehicles and roughed up for publicly calling for ‘freedom’ in the country as police used excessive force to disperse the crowd. At least 200 people were arrested and dozens beaten on 2 April 2011 when security forces shut down a largely peaceful anti-government protest in the capital, Baku. Eye-witnesses observed a number of plain clothed security force personnel arresting protestors and breaking windows of private vehicles. Many of the protestors have been subjected to judicial harassment discussed in the next section.

1. 3.                  (C) Concerns involving judicial harassment and intimidation of human rights defenders and journalists

3.1              Article 12 of the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders mandates states to take necessary measures to ensure protection of human rights defenders. CIVICUS’ and CNIS’ research in Azerbaijan shows that state agencies are often times complicit in the abuse of human rights defenders and journalists who have exercised their right of democratic dissent. It is widely believed that the judicial harassment is a common way for the authorities to pressurise government critics and their families to discontinue their work.

3.2              In a number of instances, human rights defenders engaged in criticism of state agencies have been charged with drug related and security offences. On 29 September 2012, blogger and human rights defender who has been active in the ‘Sing for Democracy Campaign,’ and associated with Nida Civic Movement, Zaur Gurbanli was detained and charged with “possession of illegal documents.” In June 2012, Hilal Mammadov, minority rights defender and editor-in-chief of the TolishiSado (Voice of Talysh) newspaper, was charged with the manufacture, storage and transfer of drugs after the authorities claimed to have seized 5 grams of heroin from him and 30 grams from his place of residence. In July 2012, the authorities claimed that he was detained for “cooperation with the intelligence agencies of a foreign country” as well as “activities against the security and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan” and “incitement of national racial and religious hatred.”

3.3              In June 2012, social media activist and photographer, Mehman Huseynov, who was active in the “Sing for Democracy campaign” and had taken a number of photographs of police violence against protestors, was charged by the police for hooliganism. The police accused him of resisting the authorities after he had a verbal confrontation with them following which the police smashed his camera. Huseynov is associated with the Institute of Reporters’ Freedom and Safety. On 11 June 2012, Iranian journalist, Anar Bayramli of the Iran based Sahar TV was sentenced to two years imprisonment. The motivation for his imprisonment appears to be the political tension between the governments of Azerbaijan and Iran.

3.4              In April 2012, member of Kura Civil Society, Oktay Gulaliyev was arrested and charged with resistance of orders by the authorities and inciting citizens to indulge in violence. He was also reportedly violently assaulted in detention and verbally abused by members of law enforcement agencies. On 20 April 2012, blogger and human rights defender, Taleh Khasmammadov was sentenced to four years in prison on charges of “hooliganism,” “disorderly conduct” and “resisting authorities.” It is widely believed that the real reason for his arrest was to prevent him from publishing reports on the connections between the police and criminal gangs.

3.5              Following the spring 2011 protests, as many as 17 civil society and political activists were convicted on questionable charges including illegal possession of drugs and evading military service. The sentences range from one to three years imprisonment. Among those convicted are Baktiyar Hajiyev who organised the ‘Great People’s Protest’ on 11 March 2011. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment in May 2011 for evading military service.  In the same month, Jabbar Savalanli, a youth political activist arrested during a street protest was sentenced to two and a half years imprisonment for illegal possession of drugs.

1. 4.                   (D) Concerns regarding freedom of association and unwarranted bureaucratic harassment of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)

4.1              Article 58 of Azerbaijan’s constitution guarantees freedom of association and the freedom to carry out associational activities without undue restrictions. Article 22 to of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which Azerbaijan is a state party also guarantees freedom of association.

4.2              CSOs in Azerbaijan are facing a number of unwarranted restrictions through legislation governing CSOs. New regulations passed by the Cabinet in 2011 and a series of legal amendments introduced in 2009 are imperilling freedom of association in the country. For instance, the Ministry of Justice can initiate dissolution of a CSO after issuing two warning letters in a year. Financial grants have to be registered with the authorities within an unrealistic time frame of one month. International CSOs are subjected to additional restrictions such as the requirement to respect “national moral values” and not be involved in “political and religious propaganda.” Neither of these terms is defined, impeding the ability of international CSOs who have to obtain registration with the Ministry of Justice in order to operate in Azerbaijan.

4.3              The requirement for mandatory registration of CSOs also seriously impedes freedom of association. CSOs that seek to advance human and democratic rights face delays in registration and remain at risk of denial of registration. For instance, the Institute of Peace and Democracy has been waiting for registration since 1995. Registration for CNIS was delayed for three years. In March 2011, the Azerbaijan Human Rights House was ordered to suspend its operations for apparent violation of registration requirements soon after it held a press conference criticising the arrest and detention of an opposition youth activist.

4.4              In February 2012, CIVICUS and CNIS observed that a number of intimidatory tactics were employed against CSOs critical of the government such as levying heavy fines for petty administrative lapses; issuing warning letters threatening to cancel registration; publication of defamatory articles against CSO members in the press; and denial of permission to CSOs to hold meetings in public spaces.

1. 5.                  Recommendations to the Government of Azerbaijan

5.1       CIVICUS and the Center for National and International Studies (CNIS) call on the Government of Azerbaijan to create an enabling environment for civil society to operate in accordance with the rights enshrined in the ICCPR and the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders. At a minimum, the following conditions should be ensured: freedom of association, freedom of expression, the right to operate free from unwarranted state interference, the right to communicate and cooperate, the right to seek and secure funding and the state’s duty to protect. In light of this, the following specific recommendations are made.

5.2       Regarding freedom of assembly, attacks on and harassment of protestors

• The right to peaceful protest should be respected in practice. Law enforcement officials using excessive force against protestors should be subjected to the full force of the law.

• Law enforcement officials engaged in crowd control should be trained on the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms.

5.3       Regarding judicial harassment and intimidation of human rights defenders and journalists

• Impartial and effective investigations into all cases of attack, harassment and intimidation of human rights defenders and journalists should be conducted and perpetrators brought to justice.

• Attacks on and threats to human rights defenders and journalists must be publicly condemned by senior government officials to ensure protection by law enforcement agencies.
• Human rights defenders and journalists imprisoned on account of their work should be unconditionally released and their cases reviewed.

5.4       Regarding freedom of association and unwarranted bureaucratic harassment of CSOs

• The law regarding registration of CSOs should be amended to remove the requirement for mandatory registration.

• Restrictive regulations regarding vague requirements such as the need to respect “moral values” and not engage in “political and religious propaganda” should be repealed.

• Registration requirements for international CSOs should be eased to create an enabling environment to operate.

• The requirement to CSOs to register their grants with the Ministry of Justice should be removed.

5.5       Regarding access to UN Special Procedures and Mandate Holders

• A standing invitation should be extended to the UN Special Procedures, particularly to the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, and Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.

While the aim of the first volume was to put the current political developments in these two states into a historical perspective – the period of state and democracy-building which resulted in creation of democratic parliamentary republics in the early 20^th century – the second focused on the post-Cold-War search for identity in Turkey and Azerbaijan. This new volume focuses mainly on the interconnection between domestic developments and relations between the two states.

As was the case with the first two volumes, this publication, which is co-edited by director of the CNIS Leila Alieva and Elkhan Mehtiyev,  is also the result of a series of  conferences devoted to the anniversary of the creation of the first Azerbaijani Democratic Republic, ADR, (1918-1920) which brought together scholars and experts from Azerbaijan and Turkey. These conferences took place in Baku and various regions of Azerbaijan, including  Ganja, Shaki, Lahic and Masalli and covered the following topics:  “Testing the Sequencing Approach to Building Democracy”,  “Democracy as the most reliable way to resolve conflicts”,  “The Human Rights Situation in Two States”, “Modernization in Azerbaijan and Turkey”, “Women’s Rights”, and “Azerbaijani-Turkish Relations and Relations with Neighbours”. Not all the articles, presented in the book are purely academic. In fact, some are policy papers or essays. While the Turkish articles are written by academics currently teaching in universities, most of the authors from Azerbaijan are either experts working in think-tanks or commentators and journalists.

The views presented in this book are very different and diverse, and some are even contradictory. However, this was another of the main purposes of the project – to reflect the debates and diversity of opinion in the two states regarding current and possible future developments in these countries. Whether written by theoreticians or practitioners, these articles  suggest alternative views on many of the acute problems faced by Turkey and Azerbaijan during the period of transition.

On the political front, the influence of the process of modernization in the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries cemented relations between two countries which were ethnically close, but very different in statehood terms. Indeed, in 1918 Azerbaijan had just emerged from almost a  century of colonial status under Russian rule, while Turkey was emerging from what had once been a most powerful empire. However, both were united in their desire to join the club of European nation states, implementing the visions of enlightened political leaders.   The following century deprived Turkey of its political ties with its closest neighbour due to the restrictions placed on communication by the Cold-War Iron Curtain. Post-Cold-War Azerbaijan was inspired both by its own history and by the strong and democratic state of Turkey next door – a member of NATO which was pursuing integration into Europe.

This volume, which is the concluding one in the series, proves once again that ethnic and linguistic closeness is not enough to ensure fraternal relations between the two Turkic states. In fact, it is state interests which determine the degree of closeness and the nature of these relations, primarily in the sense of political and security interests. In the early 20^th century, it was the nature of the modernization process which united the two states, coupled with common security concerns. These in turn were closely related to politics.

This project confirmed that post-Cold-War relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan, except for a brief period during 1992-1993,  can be characterized by a lack of  communication between  the intellectual and political elites, civil society or the broader community, unlike the situation in the early 20^th century. In fact, the extremely centralized and personalized government of Azerbaijan established close economic relations  with Turkey while   the latter  prioritized  its energy interests, relying on “comfortable” agreements with  the authoritarian leader regarding the uninterrupted flow of resources.

But these are precisely the societies which stimulate debate, movement and change, especially when leaders are wary of political involvement in the domestic affairs of a neighbour.

The book includes articles of the well known Turkish and Azerbaijani intellectuals and academicians, policy experts, journalists and NGO leaders, such as  Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, Itir Bagdadi, Tashansu Turker, Arzu Abdulallyeva, Intigam Aliyev, Shahin Filiz, Hikmet Hajizade, Ali Resul Usul, Zardusht Alizade, Ruhengiz Huseynova, Elkhan Shahinoglu and Sezin Oney.